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ABSTRACT
This essay is an exploration of the debate between John Finnis and Stephen
Macedo on the value of homosexuality. In “Is Natural Law Theory Compatible with 
Limited Government?” Finnis, a natural law theorist, rejects value-neutralist arguments,
stating that the political community can and should make value judgments about its
members’ life-choices and that such normative evaluations are compatible with 
liberalism.  Particularly, Finnis argues that homosexuality is in its essence always 
harmful and degrading, thus unable to participate in the basic human goods it imitates.  
Furthermore, he argues that the political community in liberal democratic societies is 
justified in discouraging homosexual conduct as a viable way of life. Macedo, while also
rejecting pure value-neutralist liberalism, carefully considers but rejects Finnis’s 
argument, which rests on an unrealistic description of value and ends of human sexual 
activity.  
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11  Introduction
Homosexuality is at the forefront of the culture wars in the United States today.  Perhaps 
most significant is the current nationwide push for constitutional (whether state or 
federal) amendments defining marriage as an exclusively heterosexual union.  Whether 
these pushes stem from outright political maneuvering and rabble-rousing on the part of 
politicians is not the issue.  Most importantly, these rulings, legislative pushes, and social 
trends show that the justifications for or against homosexuality and homosexual marriage 
need a clarification from our greatest contemporary legal and moral philosophers beyond 
what the scope of the law tells us.  We need a forthright discussion of how to treat 
homosexuality in the public and legal domains.  
In 1993, Colorado’s Amendment 2 case Romer v. Evans brought several 
important legal scholars into a direct debate over homosexuality and civil rights.1  Among 
those legal scholars, John Finnis and Stephen Macedo continued the discussion about 
homosexuality and the political community.  This essay will explore part of their debate, 
found in their respective essays from Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality, which 
centers on how a liberal democratic society should treat homosexual acts.2
The dominant position among legal and political philosophers is that homosexual 
activity and marriage should enjoy equal status with heterosexuality.  Much of the 
                                                
1 Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
2 John Finnis, “Natural Law Theory and Limited Government” and Stephen Macedo, “Against the Old 
Sexual Morality of the New Natural Law” in Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality Robert P. George, ed.  
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996). Hereafter cited as NLLG, and AOSM, respectively.
2prevailing literature argues that homosexuality is not inherently less valuable, and that it 
is wrong for the government to criminalize or discourage such conduct.  Not all legal 
scholars share this mainstream view.  Finnis represents a group of new natural law 
theorists who argue that while homosexual conduct should not be criminalized, it should 
be discouraged.  His contemporary natural law theory has made a case for delineating the 
foundations of limited government and with it what constitutes viable options for the 
good life.  With respect to individual autonomy, Finnis embraces the liberal tradition of 
limited government that is sympathetic to plurality, yet rejects value “neutrality.”  
According to Finnis, “a theory of natural law claims to be able to identify conditions and 
principles of practical right-mindedness, of good and proper order among men and in 
individual conduct.”3  
But what does this mean?  Essentially, there are certain basic human goods that 
motivate reasonable action on the part of individuals, families, communities, and 
governments, and delimit the role and scope of government.  Finnis believes that 
homosexuality is a distraction from some of these basic human goods and harmful for the 
individuals who participate in it.  Finnis claims his position is based upon a view of 
sexual activity that is in line with human goods and the benefit of the individual.  While 
he maintains that homosexual conduct should be discouraged (and denied any 
endorsement as a viable preferences for human activity), it is not justifiable to criminalize 
these acts or the individuals who participate in them.  
This paper is primarily a critical examination of Finnis’s view of the morality and 
politics of homosexual activity guided by Stephen Macedo’s own rebuttal of the Finnis 
                                                
3 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, (Claredon Press, Oxford. 1980), p. 18.  Hereafter cited as 
NLNR.
3position.  Macedo, sympathetic to some aspects of Finnis’s natural law theory, carefully 
considers but soundly rejects Finnis’s argument.  For Macedo, Finnis’s view of sex is too 
narrow and leads to absurd results.  Finnis’s argument in “Is Natural Law Theory 
Compatible with Limited Government?” can be viewed as two interrelated parts.  First, 
that homosexuality is in its essence always harmful and degrading, thus unable to 
participate in the basic human goods it imitates.  Secondly, that the political community 
(in liberal democratic societies) is justified in discouraging homosexual conduct as a 
viable way of life.  
In this paper I will first lay out basic aspects of Finnis’s broader theory of natural 
law that are relevant to this debate, including his description of basic human goods and 
practical reason.  Then I will describe their connection to limited government, explaining 
Finnis’s anti-neutralist liberalism before bringing in his discussion of homosexuality.  
Next I tie together Finnis’s view of limited government and homosexuality, exploring his 
position on how the public (the political community) should treat homosexuality.  In the 
last two chapters I will explain Macedo’s critique of Finnis followed by an evaluation of
their exchange with my own conclusions.
42  John Finnis’s Natural Law 
Basic Human Goods and Practical Reason
All human beings (as rational agents) are motivated to act by the things they believe to be 
good for them.  That is, they seek to obtain what they see as good and avoid what they 
see as harmful.  All human beings share the “basic human urge” toward a “few basic 
values in a vast diversity of realizations.”4  Basic human goods are actualized though 
human action (they are lived) by real individuals, and should not be understood simply as 
abstract concepts.  Finnis identifies seven basic human goods can neither be reduced nor 
derived from other goods, and are the motivation and aim of action.5  Further, these basic 
forms of human good are always reasons for action.6  The seven basic goods are: 
friendship, religion, knowledge and aesthetic appreciation, bodily life, skillful 
performance, marriage, and practical reasonableness.7   “Practical reasonableness” (or 
practical reason) is what guides and informs us as to what the basic human forms of good 
are and why and how we should seek them.  For Finnis, individuals generally seek these 
same (categorical) types of goods (with the aid of practical reason, itself a basic human 
good), which he believes are fundamental and incommensurable with one another.  
                                                
4 Finnis, NLNR, p. 84.
5 Ibid., p. 92, NLLG, p. 4. These goods are equally primary.  There is no one Good, but a plurality of goods 
that inform the many ways to live well.  
6 There are other goods that give reasons for action, but Finnis thinks they can ultimately fall back into 
these basic categories or combination of categories. NLNR, p.90.  Sound reasons for action should always 
pertain to some form or combination of forms of basic human good  .
7 Finnis does not maintain that his description of the goods in this list is necessarily exhaustive or complete, 
so it would be wrong to claim that these are the standards that we must always go by.  Also, it is important 
to note that I refer to the list in Natural Law Theory and Limited Government, p. 4.  It differs slightly from 
the one in NLNR, but substantially.  The major difference is that marriage is independent in the newer list.  
5To say that these goods are incommensurable is to say that they cannot be ranked 
or measured against one another.  According to Finnis, they are all equally fundamental 
and indemonstrable as goods:
First, each is equally self-evidently a form of good.  Second, one can not be 
analytically reduced to being merely an aspect of any of the others, or to being 
merely instrumental in the pursuit of any of the others. Thirdly, each one, when 
focused upon, can reasonably be regarded as the most important.  Hence, there is 
no objective hierarchy amongst them.8
Although the basic human goods are in a sense equal, they are all uniquely special, and 
all have distinct claims for their respective importance in fostering human flourishing.  
For example, for Finnis it would not make any sense to say that friendship is more 
important than knowledge.  They are both self-evidently good and essential to a good life.  
Individuals might value and emphasize one good in particular, but that does not mean the 
other goods lose their standing as basic human goods.  Individuals should pursue all basic 
human goods in one way or another, with the inevitability of some taking precedence in 
particular individuals’ lives.9  For example, aesthetic appreciation and knowledge might 
be emphasized in and art dealer’s life, while a professional athlete might emphasize 
skillful performance.  “Each of us has a subjective order of priority amongst the basic 
values.”10  Because of the multitude of choices for one’s life, there will be opportunity 
costs incurred with respect to basic human goods, yet this in no way diminishes their 
priority or status.  However, it would be both wrong (practically unreasonable) to say that 
one human good is fundamentally more important than another, just as it would be wrong 
and incorrect to believe that other human goods can be excluded from one’s life.
                                                
8 Finnis, NLNR, p. 92.
9 Ibid., p. 85. “Human beings and thus whole cultures differ in their determination, enthusiasm, sobriety, 
farsifhtedness, sensitivity, steadfastness, and all the other modalities of response to any value.” 
10 Ibid., p. 93.
6  Natural law according to Finnis is the theoretical and practical exploration of 
incommensurable basic forms of human good and the basic requirements of practical 
reason (itself a basic human good), which are the universal guiding platforms for human 
action and political community.11  Therefore, natural law according to Finnis does deal 
with making distinctions about what is both good and bad for individuals and groups of 
individuals.  That being said, Finnis claims that his version of natural law is not derived 
from moral absolutes, whether theologically or metaphysically based.  Instead, it is 
explicitly concerned with determining what is reasonable and what is not: hence, he 
favors “practical reasonableness” to “morality.”12  Practical reasonableness, one of the 
basic human goods, takes on the (seemingly foundational) role of delineating and guiding 
“good” human acts and ends.13  
Once the basic tenets and methodology of practical reason are set out clearly, then 
we can formulate moral standards on the basis of what is “unreasonable-all-things-
considered” and “reasonable-all-things-considered.”14  Practical reason is based upon 
nine “requirements” that Finnis argues are self-evidently rational guidelines for 
determining right and wrong ways to act.15  In this way, practical reason really guides us 
in achieving the other basic human goods by helping us determine what one ought and 
ought not to do.  Therefore, Finnis claims that his natural law theory (as based upon 
practical reason) is not a catalogue of moral pronouncements, but is instead the 
                                                
11 It is practical, because human action is always concerned with the concreteness of life lived, and 
theoretical, because it practical application requires some conceptual knowledge of the realm of human 
affairs to be successful.  
12 Ibid., p. 15, 23.
13 The importance of “practical reasonableness” for Finnis’s system is paramount, and raises more 
questions than can be adequately dealt with here.  
14 Ibid., p. 23.
15 Ibid., pp. 100-127. Such as not excluding any of the basic forms of human goods, formulating a life-plan, 
remaining open to other life-choices and the choices of others, to not carry out acts that directly harm any 
of the basic human goods, etc.
7explication of the natural tools we use to guide our actions.  While morality is an explicit 
issue for natural law theory, both morality and natural law are essentially concerned with 
reasoning about our actions.  “Natural law theory explores, expounds, and explains the 
deep structure of morality, but morality is a matter of what reasons require, and reasons 
are inherently intelligible, shared, common.”16  
                                                
16 Finnis, NLLG, p. 3.
8Natural Law and Limited Government
The political community “properly understood” is “one of the forms of collaboration 
needed for the sake of” basic human goods.17  The political community is the group of 
citizens who come together to formulate the common good.  The common good is the 
“point” (or goal) of the “communication and co-operation” of the community, a goal that 
is always concerned with some form of the instantiation of basic human goods.18  
However, there are three distinct types of common good “which provides the 
constitutive point of a distinctive type of community and directly instantiates a basic 
human good.”19  Of these three, two of them play a major part in the argument put forth 
by Finnis later: friendship and marriage.  But for now, the common good is the 
instrument of the political community in the service of achieving some goal or goals.  
Both the common good and the political community are instruments explicitly formed to 
help promote individuals in their fulfillment of basic human goods.
  Finnis rejects the notion of a life of complete self-sufficiency, or “a life lacking 
in nothing.”20  The social nature of human beings, their need for family and community, 
is vastly dependent upon others: it calls for political community.  The government, the 
institution that serves as agent of the political community, is needed because human 
beings exist in a plurality (a community), and some basic goods can only flourish fully 
with certain institutions in place.  The reason for constitutional government is not to solve 
                                                
17 Finnis, NLLG, p. 5.
18 Ibid., p. 4.
19 Ibid., p. 5. To paraphrase, these are friendship, marriage, and religious community.  These common 
goods are basic goods in themselves, while other types of common good related to human association and 
co-operation are instrumental.  
20 Ibid., p. 7.
9the need for political community,21 but simply to aim towards “human integral 
fulfillment” by formally articulating and carrying out the needs of the individuals that 
make up the political community.22
Because all human action is in the pursuit of basic human goods, and all sound 
governments (and political communities) are instruments in the service of achieving these 
goods, no political, social, or legal theory can be “value-free” or “value neutral.”  
Furthermore, according to Finnis, any sound (positive) law itself provides reasons for 
action: it imposes authority and obligation by the fact that it conforms to practical reason.  
Therefore, all positive law has a normative dimension in that it guides us in what we 
ought and ought not do: a normative dimension imbedded both in its foundation (its aim 
or purpose) and in its execution (it provides reasons for and against action).  For Finnis, 
only a theory of natural law such as his can explain and evaluate these normative 
dimensions of the law, because it is intimately concerned with the most common and 
universal reasons for action: basic forms of human good.  It is a philosophy of human 
action, and any sound analysis of law pays close attention to these fundamental reasons 
for action in its descriptions.  Practical reason and basic human goods provide the moral 
and rational foundations for limiting the power of the government (i.e., both the 
government’s function, and the extent of its authority).23
According to Finnis, the government is rationally limited in three crucial and 
potent ways: by constitutional law, by moral norms, and by its “general justifying aim, 
                                                
21 Finnis has a Aristotelian view of the political, in that the political community is a natural outgrowth of 
man’s social and political nature.  While much of convention is fabricated by man, the political community 
is not purely creation for Aristotle and Finnis, as it is for others, notably modern philosophers such as 
Hobbes who intended, to some extent, to solve the political problem itself.  
22 Finnis, NLLG, p. 7.  The complete fulfillment of which is impossible.  Nevertheless, it is the goal and 
aim of the political community and its reason for existence.
23 Ibid., p. 2.
10
purpose or rational.”24  Practical reason tells us that constitutional government (and the 
laws it supports) is instrumentally good and hence generates a duty to follow the specific 
laws of a sound political order.  Laws “should be based upon reasons, not merely 
emotions, prejudices, and biases.”25 Therefore, practical reasonableness insists on the 
Rule of Law (constitutional law) and not of Men.26  
The political community needs the government to actualize the Rule of Law, with 
the government creating, publishing, and enforcing laws. But the government must be a 
free and open one, subject to debate and scrutiny, with the understanding that it can and 
will err, sometimes against its own citizens: “the resolution of all these problems of 
human rights is a process in which various reasonable solutions may be proposed and 
debated and…settled…but does not pretend to be infallible or to silence further rational 
discussion or…forbid…reconsideration.”27  Throughout this process, practical reason and 
the “moral norms” of a society guide the law and its application.  Moral norms or 
principles are the “principles and norms of reason, which are limits, side-constraints, 
recognized in the conscientious deliberations of every decent person.”28  These are the 
moral principles insisted upon by society that are articulated through practical reason, and 
thus apply to every individual, including government officials.  
But most importantly, government is limited by its instrumental character.  
Neither the government, nor the political community, nor the common good are 
foundational and thus good in themselves.  Instead, they are instruments with the purpose 
                                                
24 Ibid., p. 4.
25 Ibid., p. 12.
26 Ibid., pp. 1-2.  The Rule of Law is favorable to the rule of men according to Aristotle and Aquinas, and, 
of course, lies at the heart of modern liberal government.
27 Finnis, NLNR, p. 220.
28 Finnis, NLLG, p. 3.
11
of attaining basic human goods, the only true ends-in-themselves.  Natural law theory 
according to Finnis posits basic human goods as foundational, self-evident, non-
derivable, and incommensurable, with the government the rational instrument of the 
political community (itself an instrument) in the service of promoting these basic human 
goods (through its promotion of the common good).  Thus, Finnis believes that natural 
law theory properly understood is not only compatible with limited government, but 
directed towards it.  Better put, modern, constitutional government can be properly 
understood as the intention, or aim, of any sound natural law conception of good political 
rule. 29  
                                                
29 Ibid., p. 2.  One that is based on the rule of law, separation of powers, elections, etc.  
12
Limited Government and Individual Flourishing
The overriding rationale for the government is to promote the conditions that the political 
community has decided help insure human flourishing in the attainment of basic human 
goods.  This, according to Finnis, is the overarching function of government: to serve as a 
powerful instrument in the service of individuals, families, and communities.30  Yet basic 
human goods should always “trump” the collective interest or a collective enterprise 
when there is a conflict, because it is inherently reasonable and logically consistent that 
they should.31  Policy and legislation that is intended as advancement of some aggregate 
common good (or interest) is an instrumental good meant to promote public morality.32  
While the government can advocate a public morality, it should not fill the role of making 
life-choices for individuals or groups.  
Understanding the basic human goods as non-instrumental trump cards against the 
instrumental common good begins to sound like a discussion of rights.  Finnis would like 
us to understand his theory as a more robust and accurate depiction than that of rights 
(and of the human condition) because of the fundamentally non-instrumental character of 
these basic human goods.  Impediments to these goods are necessarily things to be 
avoided at all costs, and excessive government interference in these goods amounts to 
impediments (whether good-intentioned or not).
                                                
30 Ibid.,  p.6.
31 This is a different conception from Ronald Dworkin’s  concept of trumping rights.  See Robert P. 
George’s Making Men Moral. (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1993)
32 Logically, the common good itself cannot be advanced if individual basic goods are restricted.  Finnis 
claims to have not only a better foundational understanding of basic human goods and natural rights, but a 
more positive and consistent understanding of the relationship between individuals (and their claims to 
moral independence) and the government.
13
If these basic goods are so essential to be like rights, how far can (and should) the 
political community go in using the government to promote such goods, and how far can 
(and should) it go to discourage behavior that it feels is damaging to these goods?  For 
Finnis, political community does go a long way in using government to secure conditions 
favorable to human flourishing, and in discouraging the “harmful and evil.” But the 
government should only be used in a limited way to regulate human associations:33
Such regulation should never (in the case of the associations of a non-instrumental 
common good [e.g., friendship]) or only exceptionally (in the case of instrumental 
associations [e.g., business partnerships]) be intended to take over the formation, 
direction, or management of these personal initiatives and interpersonal 
associations.34
The political community should never use the government to directly manage the lives of 
individuals participating in basic human goods and the associations that actualize them 
(e.g., marriage, friendship, etc.), even in some cases where vice is occurring between 
adults.  Therefore, Finnis argues that it is not acceptable for the government to coerce or 
direct people by making “secret and truly consensual adult acts of vice a punishable 
offence.”35
  When in the search of basic human goods, even when that search is flawed, the 
government can only discourage certain truly private acts.  Yet it is not inconsistent for 
the political community to foster those goods and activities seen as valuable and 
reasonable, and to criticize those that are deleterious or injurious of human good.  It must 
always be balanced with a view to a distinction between private and public vice and 
virtue: the restraint of limited government does not trump the promotion of public 
                                                
33 Finnis, NLLG, p. 8.
34 Ibid,, p. 5.  Brackets mine.
35 Ibid., p. 8.
14
morality, which means that the human acts involved are tolerated legally but publicly 
denounced.  
This leads us to the central issue of this paper, and it should be clear that Finnis is 
not advocating a stance of neutrality with respect to choices about the “good life,” 
including homosexual lifestyles.  While the human individual has a wide variety of life 
choices that are practically reasonable courses of action for his life, some choices are 
more reasonable than others.  These adhere more closely to what practical reason says are 
elemental to the basic human goods, while others do not (some are downright harmful).  
Homosexuality is one such case of defective and harmful human action that mimics real 
human goods.  For Finnis, monogamous homosexuality is a defective form of friendship 
and love.  While it may resemble friendship and love, it does not share in the important 
characteristics and traits that truly actualize friendship and love.  
But it is not the duty of government officials to interfere with the independent 
associations of its citizens.  It is also important not to pursue overly aggressive 
paternalistic policies and that “an attempt for the sake of the common good to absorb the 
individual altogether into common enterprises would be disastrous for the common 
good.”36  Thus, while homosexuality is viewed by Finnis as contrary to natural law, he 
sees more harm than good37  in directly pitting the government against particular 
instances of participation in such behavior.  Yet the refusal to punish private, personal 
acts of sodomy does not entail social, political, or legal tolerance of homosexuality and 
homosexual lifestyles; it does not become manifested in a liberal prescription as an equal 
                                                
36 Finnis, NLNR, p. 168.
37 Or, more precisely (as this implies a sort of weighing of moral choices and therefore a sort of 
consequentialist or utilitarian ethical process), the good of citizens to act privately without constant 
supervision supersedes the good of society in cases such as personal sexual conduct)
15
and neutral conception of the good life, but rather as a sort of “don’t ask, don’t tell” 
policy similar to the military position made famous under President Clinton.  Finnis takes 
a dual position on homosexuality and government which he puts forward as consistent 
and non-contradictory: that the political community should not seek to criminalize 
homosexuality, but it should seek to discourage and denounce it.  At this point I turn to a 
more detailed discussion of Finnis’s view of good and bad sex, after which I will flesh 
out this “dual position” and his defense of it. 
16
Natural Law and Sex
John Finnis argues that even the most monogamous and loving homosexual acts are 
deluded, incomplete attempts to form the conjugal, heterosexual bond of marriage.  Such 
acts, even when done in the context of a loving, monogamous relationship do not meet 
any basic form of human good (play, friendship, knowledge, marriage), but instead are 
more closely related to masturbation.  Whether homosexual or heterosexual in nature, 
masturbatory acts at best treat one’s own body and the bodies of others as instruments, 
and at worst are extremely degrading and injurious to those whom participate in them.  
In fact, views that single out homosexuality without recognizing that heterosexual 
acts done outside marriage (or performed in non-procreative fashion) are essentially the 
same, reveal simple prejudices.  It is wrong to consider the sexual acts of heterosexuals, 
whether married or not, to be simply good while those performed by homosexuals to be 
simply bad.  Only biologically connective sex done with mutual affection within the 
context of marriage is valuable, instantiating the basic human good of marriage (marriage 
necessarily being limited to a man and a woman), a common good that cannot be 
achieved by any other action.  
For Finnis, sex is a good only when it meets the dual conditions of a biological 
and mutual affection of friendship.38  That is, oral sex between married couples is still 
essentially masturbatory in nature because it fails to meet the biological requirement, as 
does all homosexual sex.  Sex itself is not necessarily a basic form of human good, and 
                                                
38 Finnis, NLLG, p. 15.  Biological union of the penis and vagina which is the true method of conception.  
The biological union has “procreative signifigance” even when it is done without the possibility or 
intention of conception. 
17
good sex must meet the dual criteria of biological union and loving friendship within 
marital conjugation (between a man and a woman).39  “Reality is known in judgment, not 
in emotion,” Finnis says, indicating that it is not enough that two individuals simply feel 
in love with one another.40  There is a real giving of oneself to another in marriage, a 
friendship and mutual affection that gets expressed in the real biological union between 
them. All other sex, Finnis (at least explicitly) considers to be purely instrumental 
towards physical gratification. 
Finnis relies on the classical and pre-modern tradition of natural law to lend 
philosophical weight and authority to his placement of heterosexual marriage and sex as 
essentially procreative and the only good form of sex. 41  He believes that the classical 
thinkers had very deep and thoughtful reflections on homosexuality and heterosexuality 
and unanimously concluded that the latter is the higher and more perfect good of the two.  
Importantly, many of these thinkers were unbiased by revealed religion (the Judeo-
Christian tradition) and lived in homoerotic cultures, which makes them special 
authorities.42  This authority comes from a presumed isolation from (what some might 
call) prejudices, uncritical mores, or reactionary biases against homosexuals (especially 
                                                
39 It is implied that marriage, as understood, reflects a deep commitment between two individuals that is 
giving and whole. Certainly, marriages of convenience or ones in which a spouse is cheating, etc., cannot 
qualify for participation in the full good of the conjugal, sexual union.
40 Finnis, NLLG, p. 15.
41 Finnis references a wide section of these thinkers, who he believes come to similar conclusions about 
homosexuality: Aristotle, Plato, Aristophanes, Augustine, the Stoics, Plutarch, and Thomas Aquinas.  It is 
important to note, however, that his interpretations of these authors on the subject of homosexuality has 
been subject to much debate and scrutiny.  Most notably, Martha Nussbaum has been one of Finnis’s 
biggest critics.  Nussbaum has consitently argued a position that directly contradicts the one of Finnis.  In 
fact, Nussbaum testified in Colorado’s Amendment 2 hearings that homosexuality was never considered to 
be immoral or shameful in classical Greece.  See Martha Nussbaum and John Finnis, “Is Homosexual 
Conduct Wrong?  A Philosophical Exchange” Vol. 209 Issue 20 New Republic, 12 (1993).  John Finnis, 
“Law Morality and Sexual Orientation” 69 Notre Dame Law Review 1049 (1994).  The exchange between 
Nussbaum, Finnis, Robert George, and others regarding her testimony during the (in)famous Colorado trial 
is intriguing and centers on some controversy regarding the interpretation of Greek texts and the Ancients’ 
views of homosexuality.  
42 Finnis, NLLG, p. 12. Most notably Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.
18
Christianity).  Finnis supports the general conclusions of the “Platonic-Aristotelian and 
later ancient philosophical rejections of all homosexual conduct” with the aim of 
supplementing his (new natural law) argument with theirs.43  He writes,
At the heart of [their] rejections of all homosexual conduct…are three 
fundamental theses: (i) the commitment of a man and woman to each other in the 
sexual union of marriage is intrinsically good and reasonable, and is incompatible 
with sexual relations outside marriage; (ii) homosexual  acts are radically and 
peculiarly non-marital, and for that reason intrinsically unreasonable and 
unnatural; (iii) furthermore, according to Plato, if not Aristotle, homosexual acts 
have a special similarity to solitary masturbation, and both types of radically non-
marital act are manifestly unworthy of the human being and immoral.44
These conclusions are not only supported by a long history of great thinkers working 
within the natural law tradition, but are available to us through reason and should be 
endorsed in the public realm.
Finnis also argues that many early thinkers failed to fully articulate the special 
status of marriage beyond that of its intention of procreation and family.  He notes that 
Augustine came close to articulating such a special status for marriage in his recognition 
of the “natural societas” of the union of the two sexes.45  If marriage’s special status as a 
human good stands solely on the basis of procreation and family, then sterile couples 
would apparently be incapable of participating in this good.  Therefore, there must be 
something special and unique about marriage that is not limited to family and 
procreation: it must truly be a special case and basic form of human good.  Through sex, 
husband and wife (although sterile) represent and function as a “biological 
                                                
43 It is not only a supplement to his thought, however, as he sees his view to generally be in line with theirs, 
stemming from and representing a reasoned and reflective approach to the subject.  
44 Finnis, NLLG, p. 14.
45 Ibid., p. 13.
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unit…actualizing and experiencing the two-in-one-flesh common good and reality of 
marriage.”46
Here it is important to note that Finnis is describing marriage both as a basic 
human good and as a kind of (non-instrumental) common good.  This appears to be 
simply an identification required by the fact that there is a plurality involved, if only a 
pair.  The married couple is a sort of community, in that they are a spouses working 
together as “complementary, bodily persons whose activities make them apt for 
parenthood,” and they are suited for children yet still a community without them.47  This 
common good (which appears to be some sort of synergistic reaction) exists even when 
conception is not possible, because the biological union has “procreative significance.”  
Procreative significance is foundational to marriage, yet marriage is not instrumental.  It 
is not a tool used for the sake of procreation and the production of offspring, but a good 
in and of itself.48  It is neither instrumental for the good of each spouse, nor for the 
creation of new life.  This is the “fulfillment of a communion” that is an intrinsic stand-
alone good: an “integral amalgamation of the lives of the two persons.”49  
For Finnis, marriage represents a “double blessing.”  It essentially actualizes two 
basic goods that are common to both partners--friendship and procreation--yet is not 
exclusively either one.  Marriage is not merely an instrumental good for the purpose of 
procreation and propagation of the species, but for the higher friendship that is actualized 
in the “two-in-one-flesh” sexual bond.50  Therefore, even sterile couples who cannot 
actualize the good of procreation can participate in it while truly actualizing the 
                                                
46 Ibid., p. 16.
47 Ibid., p. 5.
48 Ibid., p. 13.
49 Ibid., pp. 13-14.
50 Ibid., p. 16.
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biological union and expression of their friendship.51  What is common with both sterile 
and infertile couples is the intentionality of the act of sex:  the uniting of one flesh in the 
good of marriage, whether or not conception is achieved.  
But does this physical union of two sexes imply an ought from an is?  According 
to Finnis it does not infer normative values from natural (biological facts), because the 
procreatively significant sex act is not merely enough: it must include the mutual 
affection of friendship within the context of a loving marriage.  This represents a 
combination of factors that reveal the difficulty in trying to accuse Finnis of deriving 
moral norms from natural facts.  Heterosexual relations can be means to simple sexual 
fulfillment.  But they also have available to them the expression of a deeper bond of 
friendship in marriage through natural faculties given for a higher good, whereas 
homosexual relations simply do not.
Again, for Finnis, sodomy is essentially the same as masturbation in that it is 
merely an attempt to achieve some measure of orgasmic satisfaction.  In this way our 
bodies are a means to the end of satisfying our conscious desires for sexual stimulation.  
The act of sodomy is only the utilization of another body to achieve the same desired end 
as masturbation, just as many other body parts can be used (in a utility, or tool-like sense) 
for reaching such satisfaction.  Only conjugal love and sexual activity is the more perfect 
form of friendship (the highest form): homosexual conduct is a mere imitation, striving 
and failing to maintain the superior heterosexual bond and friendship.  Finnis believes his 
reasoned approach supplemented with the classical tradition is what separates new 
                                                
51 Finnis somewhat breaks from the rigid, theological understanding of marital sex being purely for the sake 
and end of procreation and that using our sexual organs for something contrary to their natural function is a 
sin.  This position separates the new natural law theorists from many traditional natural lawyers in that it 
allows for marriage to be a basic good and that sex within that context can be good without necessarily 
being procreative (but as long as it has procreative significance).  It also accounts for sex after pregnancy.
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natural law theory from the arbitrary prejudices of many people who condemn 
homosexuality.  Because homosexuality is categorically the same as heterosexual non-
procreative sex acts (and adulterous ones), homosexual behavior is seen as unnatural 
within the context of the recognition of the good of sex with a narrow, yet relatively clear 
definition.
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3 The Common Good
I now return to the public element of this debate, and the “dual position” mentioned 
above.  How should the political community approach homosexuality within a natural 
law framework such as Finnis’?52  Most importantly for Finnis, the idea that liberalism 
entails that the government remain neutral with respect to conceptions about the good life 
is false.  He argues that not only is neutrality a bad idea practically, it suffers from 
theoretical flaws in its description of private and public life.53  Finnis briefly takes on the 
major theories that favor neutrality, including Ronald Dworkin’s, with respect to 
conceptions of the good life.  For Finnis, the issue in part turns upon how we view the 
distinction between the private and the public. 
Finnis claims that a simple demarcation between the public and private is not 
possible, because people’s motivations and reasons for acting in the public must be 
informed (or more likely overwhelmingly influenced) by their basic desires and 
inclinations.54  However, Finnis does believe that we should stay out of the private 
concerns of citizens at least with respect to criminalization.  Yet there is no distinction in 
making pronouncements about homosexuality: the public can and should denounce such 
private acts as harmful to basic human goods.  In this section I juxtapose the anti-
neutralist position of Finnis with a neutralist conception of liberalism put forth by Ronald 
Dworkin.
                                                
52If, as Finnis maintains, homosexuality is harmful to the individuals who participate in it and to the 
common good in general. 
53 With others such as Robert P. George, and to a limited extent (as we shall see), Stephen Macedo.
54 Finnis, NLLG, p. 10.  Also, see above in my discussion of Finnis on limited government.
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Ronald Dworkin’s Neutralist Liberalism
Private conceptions of the good life, according to liberal theorists such as Ronald 
Dworkin, should be kept out of the public discourse.  When the political community 
debates a public issue, it is necessarily driven by peoples’ personal motivations. We are 
always motivated and act on the basis of those goods that we value, whether for ourselves 
or others, by what Dworkin calls personal preferences and external preferences.  While 
there are public and private issues that we confront in our lives, our approach to them can 
only come from the perspective of those foundational goods that spread out throughout 
the human community: those that we value generally and cherish most.  
External preferences refer to the ideals, or conceptions of the good life, that we 
(as individuals) would like to see manifest themselves in the behavior of others.  These 
are the things we favor and disfavor for others.  Personal preferences are just those 
preferences we hold for ourselves.  They are essentially self-reflective and not other-
directed as external preferences are.  Yet both external and personal preferences bring 
“pleasure when satisfied and displeasure when ignored.”55  Both are genuine desires and 
it would seem that people would be genuinely motivated to pursue the fulfillment of both.  
Dworkin argues that in pursuing policy and objectives aimed at the collective interests of 
society, both personal and external preferences motivate and justify policy.  External 
preferences, however, should not be assigned “critical weight,” because any policy 
decision based on them “invades…the right of citizens to be treated as equals.”56  
                                                
55 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), p.267.
56 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 275.  
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Dworkin specifically accepts that individuals often do act in ways that are 
contrary to what is best for them or for their particular community.  Sometimes people 
participate in activities that are not in the interest of themselves (beyond impulse or 
desire-satisfaction), but are instead decidedly bad for their own flourishing and well-
being.  Dworkin also acknowledges that people do not have a right to liberty in the broad 
sense that they can do what they want to do, unfettered by government interference.57  
Yet the government must always respect certain liberties because they are grounded in 
firmly established right to equal concern and the right to moral independence: the right 
for each individual to enjoy their own personal preferences so long as no one’s rights are 
being violated.  
Thus individual rights (almost) always trump the interest of the government (or 
more precisely for Dworkin, the legislature) in promoting the instrumental value of the 
collective good (public policy) when such policy conflicts with or acts to constrain the
civil rights of individuals.  Such rights, or better put, the “liberal conception of equality,” 
strongly curtails the community’s (and its legislature) limited concern with the (base, 
dehumanizing, or degrading) purely self-harmful actions of its citizens, because such 
concern implies a preference for certain types of action (or more precisely, particular 
conceptions of the good life).  When public policy conflicts with (or constrains) 
established liberties or rights, then it should be overturned, whether the policy put forth is 
concerned with the well-being of individuals themselves, or with promoting a broader,
                                                
57 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 267.
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more universal social goal.58  In each case, the fundamental rights that individuals have 
are binding and of higher political status than the aim of the proposed policy.
The ultimate principle(s) at work in this anti-perfectionist stand is the principle of 
neutrality with respect to conceptions of the good life: specifically the government’s duty 
to respect the individual rights and autonomy of its citizens to pursue their own versions 
of such a life.  Pure value neutrality, however, might not even logically entail that such a 
principle be adopted by the institutions found within the system at large, or that such a 
principle necessarily arise.  For, value neutrality as a non-principle is only relativism.  
And relativism cannot claim that value-neutrality is better than non-neutrality about 
conceptions of the good life.  Surely if my values must be respected by all, but if my 
values incline me not to respect others’ autonomy, then we have reached an impasse.  So 
this political form of value neutrality does not grant people a type of open-ended liberty. 
Thus, Dworkin must mean something both more nuanced, substantive, and 
constrictive when he talks about neutrality.  It is constrictive in the sense that neutrality in 
the public realm is a type of good, or something to be pursued because it is better than 
competing alternative types of political coordination.  We might call this the “strong-
political” sense of neutrality.  But we might go one more step in identifying what this 
sense of neutrality is.  That is, there is possibly a more fundamental type of politically 
desirable, non-utilitarian principle at work here.  That principle is equality; or more 
precisely, the abstract principle of equality that requires neutrality in conceptions of the 
good life by treating all citizens with equal concern and respect.  Dworkin clearly 
distinguishes between “liberalism based on neutrality” and “liberalism based on equality” 
                                                
58 Under Dworkin’s theory, it appears either unnecessary or impossible to disentangle the two intimately 
connected ways in which rights trump governmental intrusion into the lives of its citizens mentioned above.  
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in A Matter of Principle, arguing that the latter is free of the significant defects of 
neutrality.59  Dworkin elsewhere calls this the “liberal conception of equality.”60  Because 
pure value-neutrality can cause inequality, “laws are needed to protect equality, and laws 
are inevitably compromises of liberty.”61
In Dworkin’s essay “Liberalism,” he argues that equality is basically accepted by 
liberals and conservatives alike. 62  That is, most reasonable people in contemporary 
America believe in (and support upholding) equality as a political ideal.  Such a version 
of liberalism which embraces political neutrality, Dworkin writes, is not based on 
skepticism or on an atomistic view of humans, nor is it “self-contradictory.”  Political 
neutrality based on equality is “a principle of political organization that is required by 
justice, not a way of life for individuals.”63  In this essay and in Taking Rights Seriously, 
he distinguishes two ways in which equality is a political ideal: as (1) “treatment as an 
equal” and (2) “equal treatment.”64  It is both the (1) principle that the government treats 
all its citizens with equal concern and respect, and (2) that the government does its best to 
promote the basic conditions (equality of resources) needed for human flourishing and 
well-being.  The first principle of equality as political ideal is the truly fundamental or 
constitutive principle, according to Dworkin.  
This first principle of equality establishes the dignity of the individual against the 
fluctuating preferences of society and the demands of government.  It denies that there 
should be an attempt at balance between the competing demands of society and the 
                                                
59 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985),  p. 205.
60 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 273.
61 Ibid., p. 267.
62 See Ronald Dworkin, “Liberalism”, in Michael Sandel (ed.), Liberalism and its Critics (New York, NY.: 
New York University Press, 1984).
63 Dworkin, “Liberalism”, p. 78.
64 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 227.
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individual.65  For when the “government errs on the side of the individual, then it simply 
pays a little more in social efficiency…” while erring “against the individual inflicts an 
insult upon him” that “is worth a great deal.”  By curtailing the social agenda or policy, 
the government simply loses out on the possible gains that it might have achieved for 
them.  This is a hypothetical type of loss that has no real substance because it is based on 
the possibility of future gains.  But the loss the individual faces if the government 
infringes upon his liberty is much greater, because it has true substance in the present.66  
                                                
65 Ibid., p. 198.
66 Ibid., p. 199.
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Finnis’s Anti-Neutralist Liberalism
For Finnis, the Dworkinian position, with its strict demarcation between private, personal 
preferences, and public, external preferences, represents a dualism that views the 
individual as split or divided into two persons.  According to Finnis, one’s public acts are 
at the same time one’s private acts: they are part of one’s one and only real life.”67  For 
Finnis, some life choices and actions are not practically reasonable and should not be 
endorsed, whether truly private or not.  If homosexuality is not a valuable life choice or 
action, then individuals and communities should do what they can to discourage it.  The 
political community’s rationale requires that the state “deliberately and publicly identify, 
facilitate and support the truly worthwhile, including moral virtue,” and conversely, to 
dissuade the opposite.68  In this way the political community dissuades harmful behavior 
for the sake of individuals’ well-being.  Dworkin’s neutralist liberalism turns a principled 
blind eye towards the unreasonable and reasonable alike and thus does a genuine harm to 
individuals by not treating them as valuable.   
But can we rely upon practical reason to tell us clearly what is harmful for all 
individuals?  Finnis’s system entails that the reasons and judgments that claim certain 
human activities are good and valuable--while others are not--should be “widely 
accessible” to all.  He believes that all people have the capacity to understand the “best 
reasons” for the value in marriage and the corruptive nature of homosexuality. 69  Those 
                                                
67 Finnis, NLLG, p. 10.
68 Ibid., p.  8.
69 Those formulated based on reason, without recourse to common prejudice or other influences. They are 
sound “reasons as reasons”.  See p. 11, NLLG.
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reasons must not be based upon prejudice or loathing.  Any public or political 
descriptions of homosexuality must be based upon sound reasons.  Thus, Finnis argues 
the ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick to be inappropriate because it fails to explain “why and 
in what respects homosexual conduct is bad.”70  In line with the requirements of practical 
reason and the Rule of Law, public morality should be based on sound reasons that are 
clear and open to all, and not merely on the whims of the majority.  
Some argue, however, that complex philosophical reasons and moral principles 
might not be clear to all people.  And clearly, homosexuality is clearly not considered 
inherently harmful or “bad” in the eyes of many.  But for Finnis, those who participate in 
certain harmful lifestyles might be especially unreflective persons, or not fully realize 
how and why they are harming themselves.  He denies that the principles and reasons that 
inform moral norms are inaccessible to the common or everyday man.71  Even the 
classical natural law philosophers, he argues, do not claim that certain moral principles 
are too obtuse or complicated for most people.  Upon reflection (and sometimes a little 
nudge from family, friends, community, etc.), almost everyone should be able to see the 
reasonable or unreasonableness of moral principles and judgments.  Many who do see 
homosexuality as unreasonable do not have the explicit formulation of why it is wrong, 
just that it is somehow opposed to (and in some hostile opposition towards) the goods 
they do value.72  Even those who participate in such acts (including homosexuality) can, 
                                                
70 Finnis, NLLG, p. 12.
71 Ibid., p. 11.
72 Ibid., p. 14.
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and should come to view them (if they reflect upon it carefully) as harmful and contrary 
to their own well-being.73
 Although only individuals can “make themselves good or evil,” the cooperative 
nature of the political community reveals the non-individualistic nature of human action, 
which requires that “fellow members” encourage “morally good conduct.”74  Remaining 
neutral with respect to life choices is unreasonable because of the social and communal 
nature of human life, and because of a person’s responsibilities to his or her fellow 
humans.  Dworkin’s argument against paternalist policies and attitudes is that they fail to 
give due equal concern and respect to the individuals they criticize. According to Finnis, 
criticizing the actions of a certain segment of the population (homosexuals) is reasonable 
because it is compatible with respecting that individual’s well-being.75  It is not directed 
at some instrumental common good, but towards the individuals themselves and their 
own flourishing.  Finnis argues that his version of equal concern and respect (formulated 
in part with the assistance of Robert P. George) takes the person as a unique individual, 
deserving of the best that is possible for him or her.  Publicly denouncing homosexuality 
does not neglect the good of the individual, but instead takes the good of the individual as 
primary.  
Finnis would like us to take for granted that “equal concern and respect” and 
neutrality are not synonymous in the way that Dworkin contends.  If this premise is 
accepted along with the premises that all conceptions of the good life are far from equal 
                                                
73 However, it is clear that many do not, and claim that such a notion is degrading to them.  Finnis can only 
maintain that these people are simply deluded.
74 Finnis, NLLG, p. 8.
75 This is a reference to Ronald Dworkin.  Finnis argues that the neutrality and equal concern and respect 
connection has sufficiently been refuted by others, most notably Robert P. George in Making Men Moral.  
It is important to note that George and Finnis disagree on the issue of criminalization for certain vices, with 
George for and Finnis against.
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in the eyes of liberal justice and that homosexuality is harmful and degrading to those 
who participate in it, then some “publicly justifiable restraint” (of homosexual behavior) 
is legitimate.  That is, homosexuals can be constrained by the government in some
limited, but publicly justifiable ways.  First, homosexuality should be discouraged, and 
second, homosexual relationships should not be recognized by the law.  For Finnis, any 
public endorsement of homosexuality does a great disservice to the community through 
hostility towards:
those members of the community who are willing to commit themselves to real 
marriage in the understanding that its sexual joys are not mere instruments or 
accompaniments to…marriage’s responsibilities, but rather are the actualizing and 
experiencing of the intelligent commitment to share in those responsibilities.76
Granting homosexuality equal status does direct harm to the goods that heterosexual 
married couples and families participate in.  Because marriage is a basic human good,
individuals form and share views about what are practically reasonable characteristics of 
marriage.   
Yet despite the public intolerance of homosexuality, homosexual acts (when 
participated in private) should be exempt from scrutiny and coercion at the hands of 
political authority.  The “government is precisely not...dedicated to the coercive 
promotion of virtue and the repression of vice.”77 This is respect for the toleration of truly 
private acts, even those that are degrading and incomplete forms of basic human good, 
that reflects the greater duty (or more fundamental duty) of the political community to not 
interfere excessively with individual associations.  It is harmful for the political 
community to pry and invade the daily lives and activities of individuals.  Here it is only 
                                                
76 Ibid., p. 16.
77 Ibid., p. 4. 
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appropriate for family and friends to intervene, because only they would properly know 
the details of one’s everyday life.
So government should not extend its scope to punishing private acts of 
homosexuality: yet this is neither a tacit nor explicit call for neutrality with respect to 
private lives.  The public and political community should not through any of its cultural 
and social outlets support masturbatory sex or homosexuality as a valuable human 
activity.  “Paternalism on the part of the political community is justified…like the 
educative function of parenthood itself, to be no more than a help and support to self-
correction and self-direction.”78  What is tolerated in the private is not necessarily, in 
turn, tolerated or endorsed in public.  There is a consistent principle involved here, 
according to Finnis, and it rests upon the duty and role of government.  The role of the 
state, or political authority, is limited in its attempts to foster the conditions for human 
flourishing.  The private by its nature is hidden, and to a certain degree must be kept so to 
retain the integrity and aim of the political authority.  It is overreaching and harmful for 
the government to be involved in punishing vice through paternalist policy.  Yet the 
actions of individuals, even when hidden and tolerated, are not granted equal 
consideration by the political community.  Those corrupt acts must not be treated as 
acceptable, even in the context of being “private” and out of the scope of scrutiny.  That 
is, it is not simply a matter between consenting adults.  Don’t ask, don’t tell really 
requires a literal silence on the part of the participants.  
                                                
78 Finnis, NLNR, p. 220.
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4  Stephen Macedo
But what if the fundamental distinction separating loving homosexual acts from 
heterosexual acts within marriage is arbitrary?  Stephen Macedo argues that it is.  
Macedo believes that the natural law argument put forth by Finnis is wrong: homosexual 
acts can express the same sorts of feelings that heterosexual acts do, and should be 
considered morally justifiable by natural law.  However, Macedo recognizes that Finnis’s 
argument strives to go beyond the common prejudicial condemnation of homosexuality 
by delineating the boundaries of the natural law teaching on sex that is “fair-minded.” 
Within these boundaries, all non-marital sex acts (that lack procreative significance) are 
treated similarly, with no special (discriminatory) status for homosexual acts as 
“peculiarly perverse and unnatural.”79  Homosexuality is not especially degrading when 
compared with other instrumental sexual gratification, including the sexual acts of non-
married heterosexuals.  They are all equally incapable of participating in the genuine 
human goods they mimic because they are all essentially masturbatory.  
Despite this apparent even-handed approach, such a strict and narrow definition of 
“good sex” (non-instrumental sex) only leads to an unreasonable and incomplete view of 
love and sex in general.  Macedo insists that one should not stop at showing how both 
homosexual and heterosexual sex are equally demeaning when purely instrumental (and 
thus are equally reprehensible), but that the inverse should be true as well.  That is, loving 
monogamous sex between committed couples can and should be considered good 
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Liberalism, and Morality Robert P. George, ed.  (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996), p. 34. Hereafter cited as 
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regardless of sexual orientation.  Once we do make a wise and rational reflection, natural 
law theorists will begin to see that the distinction between homosexual love and 
heterosexual love (in specific circumstances) is arbitrary and not reasonable at all.  “The 
new natural law’s own moral stance, properly understood, provides grounds for affirming 
the good of sexual relationships between committed, loving homosexual partners.”80  The 
natural law position of Finnis “properly understood” can reveal how committed
homosexual relationships can embody the same goods as committed heterosexual 
relationships.
While Macedo finds Finnis’s position on sex too narrow and rigid, he is partially 
sympathetic to the new natural law’s views about the possibility of the political 
community making normative judgments about sexuality.  Specifically, he finds some 
agreement with them about the need to publicly promote basic human goods: especially 
friendship and marriage.  Macedo, like Finnis, takes issue with strict neutralist positions 
(like Dworkin’s) regarding individual choice.  When supporters of liberalism argue that 
individuals should enjoy equal concern and respect in their personal choices (such as 
homosexuality), they have not adequately defined what moral grounds such choices are 
based upon.  Instead, they have merely defended such activity on the basis that it is freely 
chosen or self-directed.  He writes that “mere choice and self-definition are thin grounds 
on which to argue for the recognition of” rights for homosexuals.81  While Finnis takes 
issue with Bowers v. Hardwick’s majority opinion because it fails to explain exactly how 
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homosexuality is harmful, Macedo takes issue with Justice Blackmun’s dissent because 
he fails to adequately defend the rights of homosexuals in a morally robust way.  
The case for acknowledging Michael Hardwick’s constitutional right would have 
been greatly strenghthened if it had been shown that doing so would provide the 
opportunity for gays and lesbians not simply to define themselves or make
choices but to pursue the same sorts of basic goods, such as love and intimate 
friendship, that are so central to heterosexual lives.82
For Macedo, homosexuals can participate in basic human goods, and it is imperative that 
the argument for homosexual rights be based upon these terms.  It is in the best interest of 
homosexuals as individuals (Macedo would say that it is a non-instrumental good for the 
sake of the individual) to have the right to express themselves in committed relationships 
and for the political community to support and endorse such relationships.  
Thus, Macedo supports what he calls “judgmental liberalism,” which admits that 
“decent, elevated forms of human sexuality require a self-restraint and moderation.”83  
The government does and should value some conceptions of the good life as better than 
others, so we must not take strict value-neutrality as an unqualified central principle of 
limited government.84  While some neutrality with respect to very controversial opinions 
is necessary, it is not hypocritical to endorse certain life-choices, institutions, or 
behaviors above others.  “While liberal principles support a wide range of individual 
freedoms, they also allow space for political judgments to be made about better and 
worse ways of using our freedom.”85  
While Macedo believes Finnis has unfairly stereotyped all homosexuals’ 
relationships as endorsing radical sexual liberationist policies, he recognizes severe harm 
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to individuals and society both in promiscuity and views of sexuality (or of man in 
general) that promote extreme freedom of choice.86  He writes that such “simplistic 
celebrations of liberations from inherited constraints…ignore the potentially tyrannical 
nature of sexual passion.”87  The lifting of traditional constraints and duties that come 
with marriage and family (duties that are important for both individuals and society) 
should not be considered part of the agenda of a homosexual movement that calls for 
equal moral, social, and political consideration.  For Macedo, making moral judgments 
about activities that are genuinely harmful does not conflict with “the protection of a 
robust and fair-minded array of basic rights.”88  Again, for Macedo, such judgments are 
in line with sensible appraisals about what is harmful for individuals.  The important 
element is that we include homosexual relationships with heterosexual ones in promoting 
the good of monogamy and marriage. 
Within this context of limited agreement, Macedo believes he has a strong 
critique of the Finnis position.  Macedo claims that Finnis’s position equates all 
homosexual acts to those promiscuous and non-procreative heterosexual acts:  
promiscuity is a distraction from basic human goods, another form of the instrumental 
use of bodies together with valueless relationships void of any bonds.  Macedo believes 
that for Finnis, homosexuals, when engaged in sex, are always being promiscuous: they 
are always using their bodies instrumentally, and not towards and within the context of a 
greater good and bond of marriage.  Masturbation is like promiscuity, so that Finnis’s 
description of all non-marital, biologically unitive sex is masturbatory and promiscuous 
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by nature.  Promiscuity is a genuine evil that distracts individuals from basic human 
goods, so public morality should do all it can to discourage all types of promiscuous 
sexual activity.
For Macedo, the breakdown of the family is (and to him, rightly so) inherently 
heterosexual. It is heterosexuals who divorce, or have unprotected, unmarried sex, 
abortions and unwanted children (it seems safe to assume he means that these are 
children born out of wedlock, left to be raised by the single parents or the state).89  The 
movement against homosexuals is therefore a sort of misplaced hysteria stemming not 
from a real firm basis of immorality and social disintegration (partly caused or 
contributed to by homosexuals), but from prejudice: a prejudice possibly exaggerated by 
the current poor state of affairs with respect to the family and the values of it.   “There is 
a crisis of the family in America, but what could be easier…than to fasten our attention 
on a long despised class of people who bear no children?”90  Furthermore, there is no 
possibility of homosexual couples become pregnant accidentally and/or having unwanted 
children.  Macedo writes, “uncontracepted heterosexual sex risks the great evil of 
bringing unwanted children into the world.”91
But Macedo points out that homosexuals can be monogamous, and he claims that 
lesbian couples are very stable and monogamous.92  Promiscuity is a universal problem 
and therefore a problem not with respect to types of sex, but of a greater cultural or moral 
problem.  Again, it is unfair to blame only homosexuals for the evils of society, and 
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91 Ibid., p. 32.
92 Ibid., p. 33. He speculates that lesbian couples are possibly more monogamous and committed overall 
than heterosexual couples.  This is an attempt to invalidate myths or stereotypes about an inherent 
promiscuity related to homosexuality.
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Macedo believes that the genuine good of the Finnis position is that it does not make such 
a distinction.  Macedo does seem to think that men overall are more promiscuous, and 
that heterosexual men seem to be sometimes bound, or forced into monogamy by the 
constraints of family and social pressures.  So if the real issue is promiscuity, why not 
extend cultural support to homosexuals (including the right to marry) and promote an 
atmosphere of monogamy?93  Wouldn’t this only assist homosexual men in settling down 
and becoming less promiscuous?  Macedo’s view is that if the common good (being a 
reflection of desiring the flourishing and well-being of individuals) entails leading 
individuals towards the good life, then allowing marriage and publicly endorsing 
monogamy for all sexual orientations should be embraced by natural law theory.  But 
because homosexuality can actualize such goods, according to Finnis, there is a barrier 
stopping such endorsement.  
Here we come to the most important part of Macedo’s critique of Finnis’ view: 
that of non-marital sex.   The first and foremost problem with Finnis’ limited definition of 
good and valuable sexual relations, according to Macedo, is the grouping of all non-
marital and non-procreative94 sex acts into one general category.  As we have seen, 
Macedo sees a limited benefit in this grouping, because it breaks down arbitrary 
distinctions between homo- and hetero- sex acts.  But for Macedo, there is room for 
further distinction, because even heterosexuals must acknowledge that sometimes sex is 
neither purely instrumental (nor masturbatory) or intended specifically for procreation.  
Surely, argues Macedo, some forms of non-procreative sex are better than others, 
because “it is simplistic and implausible to portray the essential nature of every form of 
                                                
93 Macedo, AOSM, pp. 32-33, and pp. 42-43.
94 Again, for Finnis non-procreative entails sex that is not of the union of the vagina with penis.  
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non-procreative sexuality as no better than the least valuable form.”95  Equating the 
sexual exchange between an individual and a prostitute with sex between a pair of long-
time friends or committed couples does and should strike one as being fallacious.  
Macedo claims that although it is probably right to grant little to no value in promiscuous 
sex, grouping such sex with all other forms of non-procreative sex without further 
meaningful distinctions is wrong.
Next, Macedo extends this critique to sterile, heterosexual married couples.96  
According to the Finnis, sex between these individuals, although the possibility of 
conception and procreation is non-existent, is still valuable (it has procreative 
significance) and good in itself.  But what is the difference between this sex and the 
hypothetical relationship a married homosexual couple might have?  Macedo writes that 
sterile, heterosexual sex would be “for pleasure and to express their love or friendship or 
some other shared good.  It will be for precisely the same reasons that committed, loving 
gay couples have sex.”97  
Furthermore, the distinction relies upon an incorrect perception; that sterile 
heterosexual couples form a biological and personal unit.  It may be a personal unit, but 
Macedo points out that no special biological unity takes place between sterile couples, 
because of their particular medical handicap.  Macedo appeals to an analogy created by 
Andrew Koppelman between penises and unloaded guns.98  It would be nonsensical to 
charge someone with murdering another person with an unloaded gun, just as it would be 
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sex.  However, I believe there might be a distinction that can be made between couples who are sterile 
because of physiological problems, and the elderly whose reproductive organs have ceased to function 
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97 Macedo, AOSM, p. 36.
98 Ibid., p. 37.
40
wrong to ascribe the same unity in the sex act that results in conception with sterile 
heterosexual sex.  “It's far from clear in what sense, that has any moral weight, the genital 
organ of a sterile man can properly and precisely be called a reproductive organ. It is not 
fit for reproduction.”99   If merely having the right “equipment,” regardless of whether or 
not its function is being fully realized is sufficient condition for meaningful sex, then 
what is to keep someone who has had a sex change operation from meeting the minimal 
requirements?  Macedo points out that making “biological unity” such a central part of 
valuable sex comes “perilously close to deriving an ought from an is.”100 More 
importantly, however, it stresses the material aspect over the non-material aspects of 
loving relationships.  The commitment, affection, and care that individuals have for one 
another appears to become subordinate to (and cancelled out completely in some cases) 
simple biological facts.  
When the natural law theorists broadened the good of sex to include sterile 
couples, they made a commitment to endorse “sex as a good so long as it is bound up in 
enduring intimacies, love, and shared commitments,” according to Macedo.101  Macedo 
believes that sterile couples have, just as some homosexuals may, a fantasy or 
misperception that their sex can be procreative.  Finnis is wrong to argue that the sterile 
couples can participate in this procreative good simply because they have the right 
biological equipment (lacking some specific necessary part needed to complete 
conception) because it is a real impossibility, just as it is in the homosexual acts of loving 
couples (who, Macedo thinks might also strongly want to participate in).  The 
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components of intimacy and friendship between monogamous couples form a real 
foundation for non-instrumental, valuable sex.  Finnis’s natural law position that attempts 
to make the intimacies, love, and shared commitments an integral part of sex gets 
frustrated by his equation of all non-biologically unitive sex with masturbation.  For 
Macedo, sterile couples do participate in shared goods through sex simply because those 
goods do not have to depend ultimately upon biological facts. So Finnis’s version of 
natural law is right in broadening the scope of valuable sex to accompany sterile and 
elderly couples.  
If Finnis’s argument regarding the biological complementarity of sterile couples is 
right, as Macedo believes it to be, then the only way to salvage the categorical 
condemnation of all homosexuality must hinge on the non-existence of stable and loving 
homosexual relationships.  That is, by labeling homosexuality as essentially promiscuous 
and masturbatory, it is incapable of participating in basic human goods.  Macedo 
contends that homosexuals can and do have loving relationships that are similar to 
heterosexual relationships.  Again, he agrees that many homosexuals engage in mere 
promiscuity, just as heterosexuals do, and that it is right to condemn such actions and 
liken them to masturbatory acts.102  But he argues that Finnis generalizes the common 
misconception that homosexuals are promiscuous by nature to fit his argument. Empirical 
evidence might show that homosexual men are somewhat promiscuous, but Macedo 
doubts that the same evidence would not show heterosexual men to be very similar.  So 
how can we justify condemning one group (homosexuals) on the basis of actions 
(promiscuous sex) that other groups participate if we do not think that valuable sex rests 
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so heavily on the presence of one biological fact?  Macedo answers that there is no 
justification, and that Finnis has only succeeded in clarifying the most thoughtful and 
deep condemnations of homosexuality as being based on arbitrary distinctions and 
misrepresentations.  
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5  Evaluation and Conclusion
Now that both Macedo’s and Finnis’ positions have been explained, a further critique of 
their exchange is in order.  I begin with an overview of points of agreement between the 
two, after which I lay out a brief taxonomy for each with respect to their views of good 
and bad sex.  I will then discuss this taxonomy and my critique of it with respect to both 
Finnis and Macedo.  My critique of Macedo leads directly into a final discussion about 
the range of valuable sexual expression.  I conclude with my own position that there is 
something unique and special about heterosexual marriage and procreative significance, 
yet this does not exclude homosexual relationships as meaningful expressions of basis
human goods.
But first, I begin with an overview of points of agreement between Finnis and 
Macedo.  Both Macedo and Finnis seem to agree that society should be particularly 
judgmental about sexuality.  Promiscuity certainly should be discouraged, while stable, 
marital relationships should be condoned and cherished.  Both philosophers purport to 
take a limited government approach to private matters of conduct while participating in 
reasoned appraisal of what may or may not be “good” for the social order or community.  
They both reject (pure or extreme versions of) neutralist liberalism, such as Dworkin’s 
version described above, in this important respect: there are better and worse ways of 
using one’s freedom, especially with respect to sexuality.    
In essence, they both find liberalism consistent with value judgments about life 
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choices.103  It is clear that promiscuity and divorce are problems within our society and 
that those problems have roots and origins that need clarification and normative social 
proclamations made about them.  More generally speaking, there are genuine forms of 
human goods that should be promoted, and actions that degrade or distract from those 
goods that should be discouraged.  Marital union is to be valued and promoted as a 
genuine good (a good valued over less stable and more individualistic relationships), 
while “open relationships” and promiscuity degrade both those who take part in them and 
the common good in general.  It is perfectly reasonable for the politically community to 
discourage such conduct because such moral judgments are entirely compatible with the 
well-being of individual’s and are thus in-line with equal concern and respect.   I agree 
with both Finnis and Macedo in their belief that rejecting pure neutralism conforms with 
equal care and respect for individuals.   
Their disagreement, as we have seen above, stems from their view of what 
constitutes valuable sexual expression.  What can we say is reasonable when it comes to 
the sexual use of our bodies for something beyond pleasure?  That is, when does sex help 
actualize or participate in basic human goods (or is more than mere instrumental 
gratification)?  For Finnis, homosexual acts can never be considered as capable of 
valuable sexual expression.  And heterosexual acts are valuable when done in a loving 
marital context.  For Macedo, homosexuality can be valuable in certain contexts, just as 
heterosexual acts are valuable in some contexts and not valuable in others.
Below is what I believe is a helpful (but ultimately overly-simplistic) clarification 
on the good sex/bad sex views of Finnis and Macedo.  Because the arguments herein 
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revolve around sex (categorized as valuable or degrading), we can attribute a basic 
taxonomy of sex to each respective philosopher:
Fα (Finnis’s “good sex”) = Procreatively significant sex taking place within a 
loving, committed, heterosexual marriage.  This sex must have the character of 
being the biological connection or unity of the penis with the vagina.  
Fβ (Finnis’s “bad sex”) = all sex not Fα.  This includes any and all other sex acts, 
whether done within marriage or not.  Even sex within a marriage that has the 
biological unity Finnis demands for Fα might fall into this category if it is not 
done lovingly, or if the marriage is one of convenience, etc.  All of Fβ is 
essentially masturbatory.
Mα (Macedo’s “good sex”) = Sex acts that are done lovingly in a committed 
relationship.  The participants need not be married.104  
Mβ (Macedo’s “bad sex”) = Sex performed instrumentally, i.e., for pure physical 
satisfaction. One has little or no regard or connection with one’s partner beyond 
the mutual gratification sought.105  
I believe this taxonomy reveals two key points:  First, that Macedo’s rejection of Finnis’s 
good sex is perfectly reasonable and conforms with both rational argument as well as 
experience.  Second, that an over-simplistic view of valuable sex, resting on a good 
sex/bad sex dichotomy (regardless of where you draw the line), fails to reflect reality.  
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delineate or constrain the activities valuable to the particular individuals involved in such relationships.
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Critique of Finnis
The taxonomy above, as presented, may need to be qualified with respect to Macedo, but 
for now it will be useful for my critique of Finnis.  Finnis’s position, as I have outlined it 
above, does not need any qualification.  Finnis says “non-marital intercourse, especially
but not only homosexual, has no such point and therefore is unacceptable.”106  For Finnis, 
there is something wrong about non-marital intercourse, but there is something especially 
wrong and different about homosexuality. Yet he ultimately likens all non-procreative 
sex to masturbation, thus not clearly making any differentiation between heterosexuality 
and homosexuality in this key respect.  He always connects homosexuality and 
masturbation to non-marital sex acts (and even those marital sex acts that are not 
procreatively significant), which leaves no room for admitting any types of varying 
valuable sexual expression.  
Let us assume that procreatively significant sex is the highest and most fully 
complete form of sex.  Does that by default rule out all other playful and loving sex acts 
between spouses?  While his definition of marital sex is complex and in some ways 
edifying, his outright equation of all other sex with masturbation makes any and all non-
procreatively significant sexual expression between loving couples simple, selfish acts of 
independent gratification.  Finnis makes claims that are unreasonable both to 
heterosexuals and homosexuals in his attempt to describe valuable sex in universal terms.  
So it seems that Finnis has painted himself into a corner with respect to his view of 
sexuality, especially in denouncing homosexuals. For if the point of married life is 
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mutual affection, help, goodwill for the sake of the union, and sterile couples can 
actualize these things just as well as fertile ones, why can homosexuals not participate in 
this basic human good(s)?  
Finnis’s natural law attempts to be consistent and universal but his position paints 
a stagnant and unrealistic picture of “good sex” versus “bad sex.”  Ultimately, his 
consistency entails an absolutism that excludes too much and describes the realm of 
human relationships in too simplistic of terms.  His view of valuable sex (as represented 
as Fα), is as Macedo points out, an aspect of his absolutism that is troubling to liberals.  It 
involves discouraging ways of life that may actualize participation in basic human goods. 
It not only excludes aspects of sexual expression that many couples might find valuable, 
it is overly simplistic in the way it lumps all bad sex together as masturbatory.  It is not 
necessarily the case that if sex does not meet a certain standard that it must be relegated 
to the status of harmful and degrading. Why maintain such a rigid and narrow 
understanding of sexual expression?  Is it truly the case that all forms of sex ~Fα are 
masturbatory to their core?  Macedo is correct when he concludes that Finnis “provide[s] 
no reasonable grounds for regarding loving sex within committed relationships as 
morally equivalent to the most casual and promiscuous sex among strangers.”107  Such a 
rigid demarcation should strike us, as Macedo says, as being grossly out of line with our 
own experiences, hopes, and values.  
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Critique of Macedo
For Macedo, I follow a similar line of criticism.  While I ultimately agree with his 
rejection of Finnis’s system as too rigid and narrow, his view of good sex also suffers 
from being overly simplistic (or underdeveloped).  Macedo’s discussion of valuable sex 
is couched in his rebuttal to Finnis, and is not explicitly meant to set out a system of his 
own, yet he does make strong judgments about when sex is and is not valuable.  Now, 
Mβ seems to genuinely warrant the disapproval of individuals and society, and Finnis 
would surely agree.  But Macedo’s argument for Mα seems to imply in many places that 
as long as sex is done in a loving, committed relationship, it is valuable.  This may be the 
case, and it may be that the loving, committed aspect of sexual expression is the common 
denominator of valuable sex.  Yet this does not rule out further differences between 
individuals and sexual expression.  That is, it is not necessarily the case that since Fα is 
too narrowly construed, we must accept Mα in its most robust form, or that the rejection 
of Fα entails that all loving sex is categorically the same.  
Macedo’s argument for accepting homosexuality is to show how loving but non-
procreative heterosexual sex and homosexual sex are really not very different.  For 
Macedo and others (like myself), the idea that Fα encapsulates all valuable sex really 
clashes with their own beliefs and experiences.  Acknowledging that all expressions of
love in sex must not necessarily have procreative significance, and that many couples 
cannot achieve procreative significance because of sterility, allows Macedo to group all 
types of sex in the second category together, effectively equating them categorically.  Yet 
in rejecting Fα, Macedo tacitly implies that all loving sex acts categorically the same.  
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Whereas he explicitly states that neither absolutism or “utilitarian reductionism….are 
adequate to the complexity of the moral realm” he fails to elaborate his position with 
respect to the characterization of sexual acts.108
Therefore Macedo’s reasonable rejection of Fα in no way closes the door to 
further reflection on the value of marriage and sexual relationships, and does not entail 
that all loving sex is categorically the same.  I would like to explore what the implications 
of accepting the premise that Fα is too narrow, without necessarily accepting the robust 
form of Mα. (i.e., accepting as de facto good whatever sexual activity is done within a 
committed, loving relationship).  First, however, a few points of clarification regarding 
my (possibly unfair) taxonomy of Macedo’s good sex/bad sex.  Macedo does seem to 
leave room for adjustment and further discussion.  Macedo clearly believes that sex is a 
varied and complex thing, therefore my taxonomy above is not completely fair to him.  
Furthermore, he may well embrace further distinctions between valuable and invaluable 
sexual acts and agree that I have done him a disservice by forcing him into an either/or 
system (like Finnis’s).  In fact, Macedo points towards the possibilities of some further 
differentiation in “Sexuality and Liberty,” writing that there might be to innate, natural 
differences between males and females which gives heterosexual couples an added 
dimension of complementarity that is missing from homosexual couples.109  I will return 
to this point in a moment.  
Despite these speculative differences, Macedo seems to believe that the political 
community does not have any obligation or need to rank different sex acts.  That is, sex 
acts that are done lovingly should be viewed and promoted equally by the political 
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community.  In fact, he does argue that the political community should draw the line 
where he has it, only pronouncing judgments on Mβ.  The political realm should remain 
isolated from any speculative discussions of differences or relative advantages between 
homosexuality and heterosexuality.  He writes that “speculative reasons for thinking that 
heterosexuality has possible advantages may be inappropriate grounds for public 
policy.”110  Both homosexual couples and heterosexual couples should retain equal rights 
and encouragement to stability from the political community.
Macedo’s argument is partially designed to make the case for homosexual 
marriage.  He writes: “Extending marriage to gays and lesbians is a way of allowing that 
the natural lawyers are not all wrong.”111  Macedo points out that the political community 
has “legitimate” reasons to help “stabilize and elevate sexual relations.”112  So does 
Macedo’s argument for homosexual relationships entail opening the door for homosexual 
marriage?  It seems perfectly reasonable for Macedo to draw the conclusions he does, and 
it is a proper starting point for a debate about the possible value of homosexual marriage, 
both for individuals and for liberal justice.  If homosexual, committed couples can 
express themselves in ways that include sexuality, some form of marital union seems a 
legitimate way of helping to solidify their commitment.  This does not entail, however, 
that homosexual marriage should or can be essentially the same as heterosexual marriage.  
A discussion of the merits of homosexual marriage versus those of heterosexual is related 
to this debate, but should come out of a further look at how I have set things out so far.  
Therefore, I first want to address the implications of accepting the premise that Fα is too
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narrow, without necessarily accepting the robust form of Mα.  Should we not explore 
such differences before accepting homosexual marriage?
I believe reflections such as the ones made by Macedo in his essay “Sexuality and 
Liberty” help us move away from the simple good sex/bad sex dichotomy, while still 
making moral judgments about sexuality.  While sexual expression should always rest on 
loving commitment, not all sexual expression is the same.  In fact, it can differ in fact 
both by the acts themselves, and by the participants.  I see no reason why differences can 
be discussed and evaluated within a greater context of limited government.  That is, the 
differences involved are important, meaningful, and I think imperative to any discussion 
of homosexual marriage.  Such a permeated understanding, I think, is desired to better 
understand what is tolerable and intolerable, good and harmful, for individuals and the 
political community.
It might be perfectly reasonable to make the case that there is something special 
and unique about hetereosexual marriage and family.  We might want to accept a more 
curtailed view of Mα that puts heterosexual, married sex that participates in the tripartite 
goods of friendship, union, and procreation out front.  As Macedo points out, there might 
be something truly unique and complementary about heterosexual marriage.  He asks us 
to consider an “original position” of sorts where we would have the choice of sexual 
orientation in starting life anew in a world devoid of prejudice and where marriage and 
adoption is open to homosexuals.113  In such an original position, would most people 
choose heterosexuality over homosexuality?  Are there “intrinsic” advantages to 
heterosexuality?  
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Macedo admits that heterosexuals share a unique “biological tie with children” 
that is “unavailable to homosexuals by nature.”  Now this obvious biological difference 
itself is not debated, but its significance is of utmost importance.  But Macedo “imagines” 
a reason for a possible advantage of heterosexuality.  This advantage turns on natural 
differences between the sexes, differences he believes quite possibly exist, which gives 
opposite sexes a kind of complimentarity missing in homosexual couples.  This 
complementary relationship is one built around differences that somehow fit together to 
form something greater, and begins to sound much like Finnis’s discussion of 
heterosexual marriage.  
So with heterosexual spouses there is an added dimension beyond both their 
loving bond and their biological unity (whatever its significance).  This added dimension 
is a complementarity based upon sexual differences, which does rest on brute biological 
terms.  Is Macedo saying that biological facts can inform our judgments?  Not necessarily 
in the political community, but such biological facts are so inextricably tied out with the
central issues here (valuable sex), that they play a major role in our judgments.  These 
brute biological facts, particularly the notion of procreative significance, are important, 
and I think essential to the discussion.  
Macedo rejects any significant difference between the loving acts of the sterile 
elderly and those of homosexuals.  Yet does sterile sex equal homosexual sex?  
Biologically, it obviously does not, but such a distinction should not exclude 
homosexuals.  However, such a biological distinction might still merit a symbolic 
distinction.  For in marital contracepted recreational sex there is still an implicit natural 
connection between the two sexes and the component of committed friendship within the 
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bonds of marriage.  The implicit reproductive end of sexual relations and marriage does 
not exclude the possibility of participating in basic goods such as play and friendship 
with either contracepted sex between fertile married couples, nor between infertile 
couples.  While such sex might not have conception as its aim (or a possibility) it does 
involve a tacit recognition of reproduction and the good of marital union.  
Such a view of heterosexual marital union does not exclude homosexuals from 
participating in something like it, although they cannot achieve this sort of union.  
Macedo’s challenge still stands strong regarding whether there is something inherently 
promiscuous about homosexuality, thus making it problematic for Finnis to argue that it 
should be publicly criticized and condemned.  There surely are homosexuals who are 
committed to each other with sex between them being an expression of their love for one 
another--a love that might be well-expressed publicly through marriage.  Yet we might 
still publicly support arguments that claim there is something special and unique about 
heterosexual marriage.  Despite Finnis’s weaknesses, he makes a strong case for 
something truly special and unique about some hetereosexual married couples.  It does 
seem that we should still take procreative significance seriously despite its clear flaws.  
Remember that Macedo’s critique of Fα is strongly based upon sterile couples and does 
not address the truly unique character of Fα where there is procreative significance.  
It is clear that even to sterile couples the act of sexual intercourse is meeting many 
of the basic behavior and biological conditions of procreative sex; they are simply 
missing some necessary condition that prevents them from conception.  Indeed, as the 
natural law theorists point out, the union of heterosexuals is, to some degree, a union of 
one flesh.  They deny the unloaded gun analogy is comparable because they see the
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sexual organs of human beings are not instruments, or ‘equipment,’ which have 
their value and intelligibility as means of accomplishing ends extrinsic to them. 
Rather, sex organs are parts of the personal reality of the human being. Thus, 
when spouses unite genitally-when they mate-their biological unity is truly 
interpersonal.114  
The sexual union of spouses creates a “biological unity” of one, symbolically joining 
them in a greater good.  The bodies of the individuals involved in this unity are more than 
instruments, and you cannot break any part of the individual down into instrumental 
parts.  The bodily whole of each individually is connected through a biologically, yet 
symbolically loving act.  
The natural law theorists therefore carve out a unique and distinct realm for 
heterosexual, marital sex that is both interpersonally and biologically grounded.  The 
biological component cannot be manifested between homosexual couples, thus denying 
them this sort of unity.  I admit that this sort of mystifies the penile-vaginal union, but 
does it not have some sort of symbolic significance beyond the committed love and the 
sharing of pleasure?    Macedo does not deny that the reproductive sex organs of persons 
are for the purpose of procreation (and not simply sexual gratification), but he does play 
down the important empirical facts of nature and how human beings go beyond it in 
procreation with the establishment and maintenance of families.  He wants to hold Finnis 
to his contention that he is not vacillating between facts to norms (the existence of these 
natural capacities to an “ought” is making an unconnected judgment about what one 
should do).115   However, there might really be a special status for marital loving, 
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procreative sex, which exceptions like the existence of sterile couples (and their ability to 
participate in some of these same marital goods) does not destroy.    
While it is true that people can give themselves in loving relationships that do not 
meet Finnis’s strict requirements, Macedo must also, I believe, concede that the stronger 
(or maybe higher) natural function of human sex is heterosexually oriented. But it does 
not exclude the ability for homosexuals to participate in some reflection of this good, 
despite their disability to conceive a child.  Homosexual behavior within the context of a 
loving, monogamous (marriage) relationship surely cannot be equated with masturbation, 
as Finnis claims.  So here is clearly some connection that is formed between same-sex 
partners in a loving environment, which they consider to be similar to heterosexual ones. 
However, the highest behavioral manifestation of sex is the good in marriage of a 
combination of procreative significance and friendship is a bundled and indisputably 
unique thing (as described well in Fα).  What Macedo fails to establish (which he may 
not desire to do) is the equation of this bundled conception with the most loving, 
monogamous homosexual couples act of sex; in fact, his argument is only negative and is 
based purely on Finnis’s incomplete defense of the obvious. While homosexuals and 
sterile couples may both engage in loving sex that can never be procreative (although 
with advances in technology this might easily change), non-sterile heterosexual couples 
clearly can participate in the bundled conception of sex that includes love and the 
procreative aim.  He would in all probability agree with me here, but I do believe he 
should make a stronger concession to it.  
In fact, Macedo may only be looking for a reasonable place for homosexual union 
to inhabit.  The concession that loving, marital procreative sex (as expressed in Fα) is the 
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highest ideal and expression of human sexuality, would be a judgment in line with 
Macedo’s denial of the strict neutralist position on views of the good life.  We might 
accept part of what is expressed in Fα without limiting ourselves to it as a complete view 
of human sexuality. This might allow for certain rights for homosexuals (or at least some 
recognition that their sex can be valuable in some ways), but it would not be some
theoretically or categorically equal status with respect to natural law and the 
understanding of human sexual love.  Valuable sexual expression must not be simply 
understood as Fα or Mα, but as a many faceted but hierarchical type of thing.  And 
ultimately, it is a private matter that the political community should take care in 
appraising or ranking, while never interfering in the truly private acts of individuals.    
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